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Notes
AGENCY-REVOCABILITY OF POWER OF SALE COUPLED WITH AN
INTEREST-An individual named Cowie advanced money to the
plaintiff, and as security for the loan, he was authorized by the
plaintiff to reimburse himself through the sale of a quantity of
liquid amber which belonged to the plaintiff. Defendant, an agent
of Cowie, was notified by the plaintiff that he, the plaintiff, had
revoked the power given to Cowie to sell the amber in question.
Ignoring this notification the defendant sold the amber and cred-
ited the proceeds to the account of Cowie. Plaintiff sues for the
value of the amber sold. Held, the power given to Cowie was
coupled with an interest and therefore irrevocable. Eduardo Fer-
nandez Y Compania v. Longino and Collins, 6 So. (2d) 137 (La.
1942).
The instant case is in accord with the universally established
rule that an agency in which the agent or a third person has an
interest cannot be revoked during the lifetime of the principal.
The authorities, however, are in conflict as to whether the agency
continues after the death of the principal. Although the instant
case involves the problem of an attempted revocation during the
life of the principal, the contents of this note will be directed
primarily toward a discussion of the various views relating to
the revocation of the agency by the death of the principal.
The English courts hold that a power given as security, al-
though not an estate in the thing itself, is coupled with an interest
and therefore not revocable by the principal,' but that it ceases
upon the principal's death.2 While the American courts similarly
recognize that a power coupled with an interest may not be re-
voked by the principal, they do not follow the English rule that
it is terminated upon the death of the principal. In Hunt v. Rous-
1. Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. 565, 170 Eng. Rep. 456 (N.P. 1797); In re
Hannan's Empress Gold Mining and Development Co., Carmichael's Case(1896) 2 Ch. Div. 643, 648 [quoting from Clerk v. Laurie, 2 H. & N. 199, 200;
157 Eng. Rep. 83 (Exch. 1857)]: "What is meant by an authority coupled with
an interest being Irrevocable is thls,-that where an agreement Is entered
into on a sufficient consideration, whereby an authority is given for the
purpose of securing some benefit to the donee of the authority, such authority
is irrevocable."
2. Wynne v. Thomas, Willes 563, 125 Eng. Rep. 1322 (C.P. 1745); Watson
v. King, 4 Campb. 272, 171 Eng. Rep. 87 (N.P. 1815) held, a power of attorney
though coupled with an interest is revoked by the death of the grantor.
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manier's Administrators,8 the leading American case, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall distinguished between the general situation of a
power in which the agent or a third person may have acquired an
interest, and the more specific "power coupled with an interest" in
a stricter sense of that term, and held that only the latter re-
mained unrevoked by the death of the principal. In the former
case, the power could only be exercised in the principal's name
and hence terminated upon his death. A reading of that opinion
is not productive of any very definite conception of the distinc-
tion between "a power coupled with an interest" and other powers
in which an agent or a third party has an interest. The criterion
appears to be that the agent must be able to exercise the power
in his own name if it is to be placed in the first category.4
The late Professor Mechem 5 has declared that the reasoning
of the Hunt case was too technical, being based on the old agency
theory that the act is done in the name of the principal. Applying
this theory, where the principal is dead, he no longer retains legal
capacity and cannot act through a representative. Therefore, any
act done in the principal's name after his death is a nullity. An-
other distinguished American scholar' criticizes the Hunt case as
being based on a medieval idea of extended will of the principal,
and argues that the distinction drawn by Chief Justice Marshall
is without justification or any authoritative basis. He points out
that a requirement that the agent have a legal title, as the case
seemingly requires, would virtually limit its application to cases
where he is really a principal.
The Restatement of Agency also rejects the distinction enun-
3. 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L.Ed. 589 (U.S. 1823).
4. 1 Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Agency (2 ed. 1914) 464, § 654.
If an equitable estate or interest in the subject matter was created by the
contract and the power, then there are authorities (whether consistent with
Hunt v. Rousmanier or not) which would hold the power to be one coupled
with an Interest and therefore irrevocable by the grantor's death. Osgood
v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 1, 20; 7 Am. Dec, 513 (1816); Pacific Coast Co.
v. Anderson, 47 C.C.A. 106; 107 Fed. 973 (1901); Estate of Keys, 137 Pa. 565,
21 Am.St.R. 896 (1890); Farmers' Bank v. Kansas City Publishing Co., 3 Dil-
lon 287, Fed. Cas. No. 4,652 (1876). In criticizing these decisions Professor
Mechem points out that a purely equitable interest cannot suffice to preserve
the power to convey the legal estate after the death of the principal. 1 Mech-
em, op. cit. supra note 4, at 468, § 756.
5. 1 Mechem, loc. cit. supra note 4.
6. Seavey, Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney
(1922) 31 Yale L. J. 283. He declares that a power given as security should
not be revoked by death any more than by act of the principal or his insol-
vency, since the agency is no longer purely personal; and furthermore to
maintain that an Interest in the proceeds given as security is not "coupled
with an Interest" is to make a distinction of no practical value.
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ciated in the Hunt case and furthermore states: "If the creator
of the power dies and the power is given to secure the perform-
ance of a duty not terminated by the death of the power giver, the
power survives."" Under this view a power given for the benefit
of the agent or a third party is not terminated by the death of
the one giving it."
The Roman law counterpart of an agency coupled with an
interest was the procuratio in rem suam'0 which, although revoc-
able, expressly or by death, allowed the mandatarius an actio
utilis in his own name.1 A man appointed agent in a matter in
which he is interested has a right of action in his own name.12
According to the French Civil Law, a power granted in the
common interest of principal and agent or third party is irrevo-
cable by death or act of the principal without consent of the other
party, it being in the nature of a synallagmatic contract.' A man-
date which is the condition or clause of the contract is also
irrevocable. 14 If an agent, advancing sums of money to the prin-
cipal,1 or being the creditor of the principal, 6 is given a mandate
to collect sums of money from debtors of the principal, it is not
revoked by the principal's death. Thus, in the French Civil Law
there is no distinction between a power given as security or one
co-existent with the interest in the thing itself, and since the per-
son is no longer considered as important,1 neither is revoked by
death of the principal.
7. 1 American Law Institute, Restatement of Agency 308-311, § 120, 121;
350-359, § 138, 139. Nowhere is the term "power coupled with an interest"
used, and no distinction is suggested between death and act of the principal
as means of revocation. 1 American Law Institute, Restatement of Agency
350, § 138: "A power given as security is a power to affect the legal relations
of another, created in the form of an agency authority, but held for the bene-
fit of the power holder or a third person and given to secure the performance
of a duty or to protect a title, either legal or equitable, such power being
given when the duty or title is created or given for consideration."
8. 1 American Law Institute, Restatement of Agency 357, § 139(1) (d).
9. Id. at 308, § 120(a).
10. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law (1921) 518: "The assignment
was effected by giving the assignee a mandate to sue on the claim, on the




13. 8 Marcad6 et Pont, Explication Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil
(2 ed. 1877) 655, no 1140; Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait6 Th~orique et
Pratique de Droit Civil, du Mandat, du Cautionnement (3 ed. 1907) 431, no 810.
14. 28 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (2 ed. 1877) 114, no 104.
15. Id. at 92, no 86.
16. 8 Marcad. et Pont, op. cit. supra note 13, at 656, no 1141; Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Wahl, loc. cit. supra note 13; 11 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6
Pratique de Drolt Civil Frangais (1932) 846, no 1492.
17. 28 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 14, at 93, no 86.
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The Louisiana Civil Code, unlike the French Civil Code, ex-
pressly provides that the mandate may be conferred in the inter-
est of either the mandatary or a third person.18 Despite this
express code provision, the jurisprudence of Louisiana is confused
because of the use of language similar to that employed in the
principal case.
Renshaw v. His Creditors19 dealt with the insolvency of the
principal and in holding the agency to be irrevocable, intimated
that there would be no difference between revocation by act of
the principal, or by his death. Although citing the Hunt case, the
decision relied primarily upon the French authorities. 0
In Louque v. Dejan,21 decided in 1911, the court ignored the
French authorities and relied primarily upon the Hunt case in
determining what was an agency coupled with an interest. Subse-
quent opinions of the Louisiana Supreme Court 2 rely upon this
acceptance of the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall and use
language much stronger than is necessary to decide the issue. In
only one of these cases was the question of death involved,28 and
18. Art. 2986, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The mandate may take place in five
different manners: For the interest of the person granting it alone; for the
joint interest of both parties; for the interest of a third person; for the in-
terest of such third person and that of the party granting it, and finally, for
the interest of the mandatary and a third person."
Art. 3027, La. Civil Code of 1870, which enumerates the ways In which a
procuration expires, has been held to apply only to naked powers. Renshaw
v. His Creditors, 40 La. Ann. 37, 3 So. 403 (1888). It was amended by La. Act
19 of 1882 to make a power of attorney by public or private act, or by letter,
to transfer shares of stock or bonds on the books of a corporation, where the
person receiving the power has paid value therefor, irrevocable by any cause.
This amendment was not necessary because a power thus given is necessarily
for the interest of the agent or a third person, which would render it irrevo-
cable.
19. 40 La. Ann. 37, 3 So. 403 (1888).
20. In Union Garment Co. v. Newburger, 124 La. 820, 50 So. 740 (1909), it
was held that the power of attorney was an essential part of the contract
and therefore irrevocable.
21. 129 La. 519, 526, 56 So. 427 (1911): "We are led at this point to the in-
quiry, What is the power coupled with an interest?
"We find a ready answer by Chief Justice Marshall in Hunt v. Rous-
manler, 8 Wheat. 178, 204, 5 L.Ed. 589. It is that the power delegated to col-
lect, and the interest of ownership in the property are vested in the same
person."
22. Fowler v. Phillips, 159 La. 668, 106 So. 26 (1925); Planter's Lumber
Co. v. Sugar Cane By-Products Co., 162 La. 123, 110 So. 172 (1926); Succession
of Toombs, 167 La. 21, 118 So. 488 (1928); Price v. Foster, 177 La. 586, 148 So.
887 (1933); Bryson v. United Gas Public Service Co., 169 So. 350 (La. App.
1936); United Gas Public Service Co. v. Christian, 186 La. 689, 173 So. 174
(1937); Marchand v. Gulf Refining Co. of La., 187 La. 1002, 175 So. 647 (1937);
In re Buller's Estate, 192 La. 644, 188 So. 728 (1939).
23. Succession of Toombs, 167 La. 21, 118 So. 488 (1928). Although the
case did not cite Louque v. Dejan, it did state the principal of the Dejan and
Hunt cases. While ordinarily a power of attorney is terminated by the death
the same result could have been reached by relying upon the
French authorities.
In the principal case, Justice McCaleb declared: "To consti-
tute such an agency [coupled with an interest] it is necessary that
there should co-exist in the agent, along with the power given
him, an interest or estate in the thing to be disposed of or man-
aged under the power. '24 Though the court did not cite the Hunt
case it relied upon earlier Louisiana cases 25 which in turn had
adopted the common law rule as stated by Chief Justice Marshall.
While the Hunt case did not hold that a power must be coupled
with an interest so as to render it irrevocable by an act of the
principal, the principal case purports to require this, thus indicat-
ing that the Louisiana rule is even more rigid.
Looking more specifically to the facts of the case, Cowie had
no legal title to the amber nor any privilege or chose in action.26
Thus it would seem to follow that there was no interest such as
Chief Justice Marshall and the Louisiana court apparently deems
necessary. Although the principal case was correctly decided, the
language used is unfortunate in that it appears to follow the often
criticized Hunt case.27 The reasoning of that decision is fast losing
ground with legal commentators 28 who see no valid basis for the
distinction between revocation by act of the principal and revoca-
tion by his death. The view of the French authorities, that if there
is a power in the nature of a synallagmatic contract or a clause of
such contract then the power should survive the death of the
principal, also admits no distinction.
The distinction verbally adopted by the principal case seems
rather artificial. There is no good reason why a power given as
security should not survive the death of the principal and one
of the principal, yet this is not so when the power of attorney is coupled
with an interest.
24. Eduardo Fernandez Y Compania v. Longino and Collins, 6 So. (2d)
137, 142-143 (La. 1942).
25. Union Garment Co. v. Newburger, 124 La. 820, 50 So. 740 (1909);
Louque v. Dejan, 129 La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911); Fowler v. Phillips, 159 La.
668, 106 So. 26 (1925); Marchand v. Gulf Refining Co. of La., 187 La, 1002, 175
So. 647 (1937); Bryson v. United Gas Public Service Co., 169 So. 350 (La. App.
1936).
26. See Seavey, loc. cit. supra note 6, to the effect that the logic of the
Hunt doctrine is to require the existence of one of these requisites.
27. Seavey, loc. cit. supra note 6; 1 Mechem, loc. cit. supra note 4; Note
(1932) 6 U. of Cincinnati L. R. 233.
28. Seavey, op. cit. supra note 6, at 287: "The case is remarkable for the
almost unanimous acceptance of its reasoning by the American courts and
for the avoidance of its effects by many of them."
The distinction in the Hunt case has lost much of its effect by the en-
largement of the term "Interest." Comment (1933) 19 Cornell L. Q. 267.
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"coupled with an interest" should. The interest seems to be
equally efficacious in both cases regardless of whether it is en-
grafted in the thing itself. To require that a power coupled with
an interest or estate in the thing to be disposed of must be held
by the agent to render the agency irrevocable by the principal is
an innovation which even the Hunt case does not support. Since
no distinction between a power coupled with an interest and one
given as security is recognized by the French authorities, the
early Louisiana cases, or the modern trend of American legal
thought, it is particularly unfortunate that the court saw fit to
give lip service to it in the principal case.
J.C.W.
BOTTLER'S LIABILITY TO ULTIMATE CONSUMERS FOR INJURY
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTs-Plaintiff sustained certain in-
juries as a result of the explosion of a bottle of carbonated bev-
erage. Plaintiff, relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,' re-
ceived a judgment in the trial court, which judgment was set
aside by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, the court indicating
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to this
type of case. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, reversed
the decision of the circuit court and reinstated the judgment of
the district court. Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works, 199 La. 599, 6
So. (2d) 677 (1941).
The decisions of American state courts applying to cases in-
volving liability of manufacturers to ultimate consumers where
bottled beverages have exploded or contained deleterious sub-
stances are marked by a noticeable lack of uniformity.
Courts have approached the problem upon two distinct the-
ories of liability,2 i.e., the tort theory of negligence and the con-
tract theory of implied warranty. The latter has been increasingly
applied in recent years.
A majority of the common law courts, in applying the negli-
gence theory, have held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
1. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine see the article by Malone,
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana
Cases (1941) 4 LOUiSIANA LAw REvimw 70.
2. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 688-689.
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